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I. Introduction
Substantial literatures are available to schedule resources inside the hospitals in healthcare system [1] [2] [3] [4] . However, how to hire (to schedule) resources (expert consultants (ECs) etc.) along with their pricing schemes from outside the hospitals are mostly unaddressed [5] [6] [7] [8] . It is observed that, with the prodigious growth of the communication media (say video conferencing, Internet, smart phones etc.), it may be an usual phenomena to have the consultancies by the experts (especially doctors) from outside the hospital(s). It is to be noted that the doctors can provide consultancies by being present at the consultancy spot (where the patient is admitted) particularly virtually (using video conferencing, Internet, smart phones etc.) etc. making them pervasive. In our future references ECs and doctors will be used interchangeably. In this paper, an attempt is made to hire expert consultants from outside the hospital when a patient is budget limited. The detailing of the hiring concept in this paper is shown in Figure 1 . In our model, the hiring concept is shown as a two fold process. In the first fold, the accumulated hospital's budget can be utilized to detect the leaders in the social graph (representing ECs professional connections) to inform about the hiring concept to the substantial number of doctors. In the second fold, the subset of doctors will be selected from the set consisting of doctors as leaders and the informed doctors for the consultancy process, such that the total payment made to the doctors is within patient's budget.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II elucidates the related works. Section III describes our proposed model. The proposed mechanisms are illustrated in section IV. The analysis of the proposed mechanisms are illustrated in section V. In section VI experiments and results are shown. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. Related prior work
In past the handful of works have been done, focusing on scheduling inside the hospitals (or internal scheduling) in terms of operation theatres (OTs) scheduling [9] [1][2] [10] and internal staffs (such as nurses [3] [11] , physicians [12] [4] etc.) scheduling. In [13] [10] the works have been done for allocating OTs on time to increase OTs efficiency. In our future references, hospital(s), medical unit(s), organization(s) will be used interchangeably. As with the enhancement in the technologies, mainly communication media (say video conferencing, Internet, smart phones etc.), it may be an usual phenomena to think of the scheduling of medical staffs (mainly doctors) outside the in-house hospital [5] [6] [14] . In [5] a doctor is providing the expertise through video conferencing to a patient admitted to other hospital with prior contact. In [15] the context of the patient (such as age, sex, medical report etc.) is utilized to take the expertise of the doctors from outside the admitted hospitals in nonstrategic setting. In [6] the strategic case is considered and is solved using mechanism design with money and in [7] [8] mechanism design without money is utilized. Despite some progress in the scenario of hiring ECs from outside the hospital(s), the patients with budget constraints case has been largely overlooked. In this paper, the problem of hiring doctors from outside the hospital is studied in this setting.
III. System model

A. Notation and Preliminaries
In this section, we formalize the doctors hiring problem where the multiple doctors are hired from outside of the hospital, for a patient having budget B ′ . The patient's budget B ′ is a public information. The hospital to which a patient is admitted is having an accumulated, publicly known budget B, which will be utilized to inform about the hiring concept to the substantial number of ECs. The set of ECs is given as S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m }; where each EC s i ∈ S is assumed to be professionally connected with some χ i ⊆ S\{s i }. The professional connections are given by a social graph G(V, E), where V is the set of nodes representing ECs and E is the set of edges representing their professional connections in the social graph. Each s i is associated with a hospital i ∈ H. Our model consists of two fold process. In the first fold, there is a social graph that is represented as G(V, E) and publicly known expert consultant activation function given as I : 2 S → R ≥0 . Given the subset Γ ⊆ S the value I(Γ) represents the expected number of doctors that are made aware about the hiring concept i.e.
Each node in the graph represents a doctor s i that has a private cost (aka bid) c i of being an initial adapter or the cost for spreading awareness about the hiring concept to other doctors. The cost vector of all the m doctors is given as: C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c m }. It is to be noted that, the ECs are rational and strategic in nature. It means that, the ECs can gain by misreporting their private cost. As the ECs are strategic; so each s i ∈ S may report their cost for being an initial adapter as c ′ i instead of c i in order to gain; where c ′ i c i . The payment vector for the set Γ is given as P Γ = {P Γ 1 , P Γ 2 , . . . , P Γ k }; where P Γ i is the payment of s i ∈ Γ. The objective of the first fold is to maximize the expert consultant activation function while the total payment is at most hospital's budget B. In the second fold, we have a set of doctors consisting of doctors acted as leaders in the first fold and the aware doctors given asŜ = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s i−1 , s i , . . . , s n } such that n ≤ m. The quality vector of all the m ECs is given as
In general, the quality Q i of a doctor s i can be estimated using various parameters calculated later in the section. The publicly known quality function is given as D : 2Ŝ → R ≥0 . Given a subset Υ ⊆Ŝ, the value D(Υ) denotes the sum of the qualities of all the doctors in Υ i.e. D(Υ) = i∈Υ Q i . For this fold, each doctor s i ∈Ŝ will bid afresh their cost (private) for providing consultancy to the patient and is given asc i . The cost vector of all the n doctors is given as:C = {c 1 ,c 2 , . . . ,c n }. The strategic behaviour of the doctors is continued in this fold also; so each s i ∈Ŝ may report their cost of consultancy asc ′ i instead ofc i in order to gain; wherec ′ i c i . Our objective is to determine the subsetŜ ′ ∈ {ξ| i∈ξci ≤ B ′ } for which D(Ŝ ′ ) is maximized and the total payment should not exceed the patient's budget B ′ . The payment vector of the setŜ ′ is given asP = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . ,P r }.
B. Quality determination
The parameters that determine the quality of each doctor s i are: (1) qualification of s i given as q i (2) success rate of s i given as sr i (3) experience of s i given as e i (4) hospital to which s i belong given as i . So, the quality of doctor s i is given as:
The weighted sum of the some of the parameters considered in our case will result in the quality of the doctors.
C. Budget distribution and utilization
In our scenario, each fold is utilizing the budget from two independent sources. Firstly, talking about the hospital's budget it can be thought of as 1) the accumulated fund from the previously admitted patients say adding 5-6% of the total fees of each patients to the hospital fund. 2) Donation to the hospital by high profile persons or communities. Next, the source of the budget utilized in the second phase is the patient itself. [16] ). The marginal contribution of an EC s i ∈ S is the number of ECs informed about the hiring concept by the EC s i given the set of i − 1 ECs i.e. Γ i−1 already selected as the leaders. Mathematically, the marginal contribution of i th EC given Γ i−1 is defined as:
Definition 1 (Marginal Contribution
Definition 2 (Quality Contribution [17] ). The quality contribution of an EC s i ∈ S given a subset Υ i−1 of ECs already been selected is given as:
IV. Proposed mechanisms
In this section, we present proposed mechanisms: Nontruthful budget constraint (NoTBC) mechanism motivated by [18] and Truthful budget constraint (TBC) mechanism motivated by [16] [17] .
A. NoTBC mechanism
It is a two pass mechanism consisting of Non-truthful budget constraint leader identification (NoTBC-LI) mechanism and Non-truthful budget constraint doctor selection (NoTBC-DS) mechanism.
1) NoTBC-LI mechanism: In each iteration of while loop, a doctor with maximum marginal contribution per cost among the available doctors is considered and is selected only if its cost for being an initial adapter is less than the hospital's budget. The payment of each doctors as a leader is their revealed cost.
S ← S \ {s i } 8: end while 9:Ŝ = Γ ∪S 10: for each s i ∈ Γ do 11:
In each iteration of while loop, a doctor with maximum quality contribution per cost among the selected doctors by NoTBC-LI mechanism is considered and is hired only if its cost for the consultancy is less than the patient's budget. The payment of each hired doctors is their revealed cost of consultancy. Algorithm 2 NoTBC-DS mechanism (Ŝ, B ′ ,C)
end if 6:Ŝ ←Ŝ \ {s i } 7: end while 8: for each s i ∈Ŝ ′ do 9:P i ←c i ;P ←P ∪ {P i } 10: end for 11: returnŜ ′ ,P Lemma 2. The NoTBC mechanism is individually rational.
Proof: From line 11 of Algorithm 1, we can see P Γ i = c i for each s i ∈ Γ. Line 9 in Algorithm 2 shows thatP i = c i . Therefore, we have payment for any winner is its cost. Hence, NoTBC mechanism is individually rational.
Lemma 3. The NoTBC mechanism is budget feasible.
Proof: As it is clear that a doctor is included in the winning set only when the given condition in line 4 of Algorithm 1 and line 3 of Algorithm 2 is satisfied. As the payment in case of NoTBC is equal to the cost; the total payment will be at most the budget. Hence, NoTBC mechanism is budget feasible.
B. TBC mechanism
It is a two pass mechanism consisting of Truthful budget constraint leader identification (TBC-LI) and Truthful budget constraint doctor selection (TBC-DS) mechanisms.
1) TBC-LI mechanism: For first fold of hiring problem, we propose a TBC-LI mechanism motivated by [16] [17] .
Allocation rule: In this, a doctor with maximum marginal contribution per cost among the available doctors Algorithm 3 TBC-LI allocation mechanism (G, S, B, C)
c j 5: end while 6:Ŝ = Γ ∪S 7: return Γ andŜ is considered. But the doctor is selected as the leader only when the ratio between their cost as the initial adapter and budget is less than or equal to half of the ratio between their marginal contribution and the value of the subset already selected.
Example 1(a): Figure 2a show the initial configuration of the social graph along with cost distribution, and marginal contribution (m.c.). The quality vector of the nodes is given as: Q = {5, 1, 3, 5, 4, 5}. Higher the value, higher will be the quality. For understanding purpose we are taking the quality of the doctors as an integer value but in general it may not be the case. It is to be noted that the unit of cost and budget is taken as $. We have considered hospital's budget to be 10. Using line 1 of the Algorithm 3 the node 4 is considered. The condition 2 ≤ 5· ( 3 3+0 ) for node 4 is satisfied. So, Γ = {4} andS = {3, 5, 6}. Next, node 3 will be considered and 2.5 ≤ 5· ( 3 3+3 ) for node 3 is satisfied. So, Γ = {4, 3} and S = {3, 5, 6, 1, 2, 4}. So, we haveŜ = {3, 5, 6, 1, 2, 4}.
Payment rule: The payment rule is motivated by [17] .
Algorithm 4 TBC-LI pricing mechanism (Γ, B, C)
Γ ′ ← Γ ′ ∪ {s j } ⊲ Γ ′ is the set of leaders when s i is not in the market. 7 :
end while 10:
for each s j ∈ Γ ′ do 12:
13:
end for 14:
In this, for each doctor s i ∈ Γ consider running line 3 − 9. Next, determine the smallest index ℓ in the sorting of |Γ ′ | doctors (determined without s i ) such that the ratio between their cost as the initial adapter and budget is less than or equal to the ratio between their marginal contribution and the value of the subset already selected. Now for each point j ∈
that doctor s i can declare in order to be allocated instead of the doctor in the j th place in the sorting; where M j C i (Γ ′ j−1 ) is the marginal contribution of doctor s i when considered on j th place is given as:
. Now, if this cost does not exceed the threshold payment 2) TBC-DS mechanism: For the second fold of the doctors hiring problem, we propose a TBC-DS mechanism motivated by [16] [17] .
Allocation rule: In this, firstly the available doctors are sorted in decreasing order based on quality contribution by cost. Now, the doctors are greedily selected but will be hired only when the ratio of the selected doctor's cost of consultation and the patient's budget is less than or equal to the ratio between the quality contribution by the selected doctor and the value of the quality of the selected subset.
Algorithm 5 TBC-DS allocation mechanism (Ŝ, B ′ ,C) Figure  2a . We have utilized the same cost vector as given in Figure  2 . The patient's budget is given as 8. The quality vector is given as Q = {5, 1, 3, 5, 4, 5}. The set of nodes informed by the leaders {4, 3} is given as {3, 5, 6, 4, 1, 2}. So, the nodes 3, 5, 6, 4, 1, and 2 are sorted based on quality contribution per cost and is given as: {1, 4, 6, 3, 2, 5}. First node 1 is considered and the condition 2 ≤ 8· ( 5 5 ) for node 1 is satisfied. So,Ŝ ′ = {1}. Next, node 4 will be considered and the condition 2 ≤ 8· ( 5 10 ) for node 4 is satisfied. So,
Payment rule: The Payment rule is motivated by [17] . For each s i , it is defined as the minimum of the doctor's proportional share and the threshold payment.
;P ←P ∪P i 3: end for 4: returnP
The payment of doctors inŜ ′ = {1, 4} is:
Lemma 4. The TBC mechanism is computationally efficient.
Proof:
The time complexity is given as O(m 2 ). Please see the full version of this paper [19] for details.
V. Analysis of TBC-LI and TBC-DS Lemma 5. In TBC-LI, the total payment made to the doctors are within hospital's budget B.
Proof: The proof is motivated by [16] . As the maximum payment that any winning EC i can be paid is
I (Γ i−1 ∪{i}) . The total payment of the ECs as leaders i.e. T P I is given as:
Hence, it is proved that the incentive compatible total payment do not exceed the budget. Lemma 6. In TBC-LI mechanism, if any doctor s i comes ahead of its current position say i ′ < i by declaring a cost c i ′ < c i then,
Proof: If the EC i by reporting c i ′ moves at position i ′ such that i ′ < i as depicted in Figure 4 below: From the definition of I(·) we can say: I(Γ i ′ −1 ) < I(Γ i−1 ). As the set Γ i ′ −1 is smaller as compared to the set Γ i−1 , so from the definition of the monotone sub-modular marginal contribution property, it can be said:
Marginal contribution of i given Γ i−1 (1) The number of ECs leaders by the set Γ i ′ will be less than the number of ECs leaders by Γ i . Mathematically,
Combining equation 1, equation 2 and multiplying both side by B 2 , we get
Hence, it is proved. Theorem 1. TBC-LI mechanism is monotone.
Proof: Fix i, c −i , c i , and c i ′ . For mechanism TBC-LI mechanism to be monotone, we need to show that, any winning EC i with private cost c i will still be considered in the winning set of ECs when declaring c i ′ such that c i ′ < c i or any losing EC i with private cost c i will still be considered in the losing set of ECs when declaring c i ′ such that c i ′ > c i . The proof is divided into two cases. Case 1. In this case, the i th winning EC deviates and reveals a cost of consultation c i ′ < c i . Again two cases can happen. If the EC i shows a small deviation in his/her (henceforth his) cost c i i.e. c i ′ such that c i ′ < c i and the current position of the EC i remains unchanged. In this situation, it can still be considered in the winning set. It is to be noted that, if the EC i reports a large deviation in his cost c i i.e. c i ′ such that c i ′ < c i , then in this case by definition:
EC i will be placed some position ahead (say i ′ ) of its current position say i i.e. i ′ < i. This scenario is depicted in Figure  5 below. From Lemma 6 it can be said that if EC i is placed some position ahead by revealing a cost c i ′ < c i then it must satisfy
Let us suppose for the sake of contradiction that, when the EC i ∈ S comes ahead in ordering say at some position i ′ such that c ′ i < c i , then it is not considered in the winning set of the EC because it is not satisfying the given budget. If this is the case, then it means that: : Please see the full version of this paper [19] for details.
Hence, the theorem is proved.
VI. Performance Evaluation
We compared our proposed mechanisms against the benchmark mechanism (random mechanism). In this, the doctors are selected randomly and are paid their declared cost. We have utilized the coverage model for the first fold of our hiring problem. The performance metric includes the Interested doctors set size, and Number of doctors hired. The unit of cost and budget is $.
A. Simulation set-up
For our simulation purpose, a social graph is generated randomly using Networkx package of python. It consists of 1000 nodes (doctors) and approximately 28,250 edges. The maximum and minimum degree a node can have is 10% and 1% of the total available nodes respectively. The cost of each node as initial adapter is uniformly distributed over [30, 50] , the cost of consultancy is uniformly distributed over [35, 50] , and quality is uniformly distributed over [20, 50] . The budget is considered in range [100, 1000].
B. Result analysis
The simulation results shown in Figure 9 shows the comparison of the interested doctors set size i.e. the number of doctors acting as leaders and the number of doctors informed by the leaders about the hiring concept. It is seen in Figure 9 that the interested doctors set size in case of NoTBC mechanism is higher than TBC mechanism and random mechanism. This nature of NoTBC mechanism is obvious due to the fact that the mechanisms (NoTBC-LI and NoTBC-DS) are utilizing almost the complete quota of the available budgets whereas TBC mechanism is utilizing only a part of total budget. With the increase in budget, one can easily see the increasing gap between NoTBC mechanism and TBC mechanism. It can be seen evidently in Figure 10 that the number of doctors hired in case of NoTBC mechanism is higher than TBC mechanism and random mechanism. Similar reasoning can be given as above.
VII. Conclusions and future works
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of hiring the doctors from outside of the hospital when a patient is constrained by budget. Designing a more general mechanism in this environment for the set-up consisting of multiple patients say n (each patient is associated to different hospitals) and m doctors can be thought of as the future work.
